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NASA ASRS:  
Since 2000, pilots have reported their failure to properly set the 
flaps for takeoff well over 80 times! 
 
Hanging	by	a	thread…	
•  ASRS	#658970		
•  DCA,	VMC		
•  Crew	of	B737-800	reporWng:	
•  “..	As	we	started	the	taxi,	I	called	for	the	taxi	checklist,	but	
became	confused	about	the	route	and	queried	the	ﬁrst	
oﬃcer	to	help	me	clear	up	the	discrepancy.	We	discussed	
the	route	and	conWnued	the	taxi...			We	were	cleared	for	
takeoﬀ	from	runway	1,	but	the	ﬂight	a`endant	call	chime	
wasn't	working.	I	had	called	for	the	Before	Takeoﬀ	
checklist,	but	this	was	interrupted	by	the	communicaWons	
glitch.	..	On	takeoﬀ,	rotaWon	and	liboﬀ	were	sluggish.	At					
100-150	b	as	I	conWnued	to	rotate,	we	got	the	sWck	
shaker.	The	ﬁrst	oﬃcer	noWced	the	no	ﬂap	condiWon	and	
placed	the	ﬂaps	to	5.	(No	takeoﬀ	warning	horn.		
Discovered	popped	circuit	breaker	at	the	gate)…”	
20 August 2008 
Madrid 
Spanair 5022 
16 August 1987 
Detroit 
Northwest Airlines 255 
21 years, or rather 32, and what have we learned? 
 
How come we keep making the same mistakes? 
QuesWon:	
So	what	are	we	learning?	
Or	
What	are	we	being	taught?	

 
Set flaps, verify in position 
Obtain clearance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Begin checklist 
 
Checklist complete 
 
 
 
 
Begin checklist 
Checklist complete 
 
“Flaps 5, taxi clearance” 
 
 
Start taxiing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ask for checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ask for checklist 
Line up with runway 
TAXI CLEARANCE 
MONITOR 
Ground 
MONITOR 
 Ground, Company 
MONITOR 
 CA taxiing 
CAPTAIN   
  
FIRST OFFICER Taxi		to	the	runway	
 
Set flaps, verify in position 
Obtain clearance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Begin checklist 
 
Checklist complete 
 
 
 
 
Begin checklist 
Checklist complete 
 
“Flaps 5, taxi clearance” 
 
 
Start taxiing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ask for checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ask for checklist 
Line up with runway 
TAXI CLEARANCE 
MONITOR 
Ground 
MONITOR 
 Ground, Company 
MONITOR 
 CA taxiing 
CAPTAIN                                                                                  FIRST OFFICER 
A 
… 
then 
… 
B 
… 
then 
… 
C 
… 
etc 
Pilot calls when ready Pilot is ready 
AcWviWes	are:	
•  Linear:	task	B	always	follows	task	A,	in	a	
ﬁxed 	sequence	
•  Controllable:		tasks	iniWated	by	each	pilot,	
	independently,	at	their	choice	
•  Predictable:	informaWon	available	when	
	needed,	communicaWons	possible		when	
necessary	
Which	makes	for	simple	teaching	and	easy	
learning!	
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taxi instructions
Continue to monitor CA
Calculate & reset 
Performance data
Inform Company (new #s, delays)
Have CA cross check #s
FMC: program/verify
Systems configuration?
 (APU, Packs)
Just-in or new 
load data
Busy frequency
Ice/Snow
Ice/Snow
FO busy
Change in 
takeoff sequence
Delay
Unfamiliar taxi instructions
Unfamiliar with airport/taxi route
Shut down one engine?
+ Verify ramp area clear + Form mental picture of taxi route + Acknowledge clearance + Form mental picture of taxi route 
+ Confirm CA’s understanding of route 
+ APU off-loaded 2 min  
before shutting down 
+ Acknowledge clearance 
+ Strobes 
+ FMC update + Landing lights 
+ Verify runway clear 
+ Radar? 
Check accuracy
+ “Clear” turns 
+ “Clear” turns 
Defer communication
Contact Ground when possible
Defer takeoff flaps
Consult charts
+ “Clear” ramp area 
De-icing checklist
CAPTAIN                                                                                  FIRST OFFICER 
Restart it before takeoff
Repeat checklist Acknowledge instructions
Form new mental pictureDefer  checklist
Remember to ask 
again when FO available 
Set flaps before takeoff
Verify with FO
Rush/repeat checklist
+ MONITOR  
airport traffic + MONITOR
taxi progress 
per instructions
+ MONITOR
Tower frequency
+ Switch to Tower frequency 
Resume checklist
InterruptionBrief new  runwayConsult charts
Accept new runway?
Change in takeoff runway
+ Confirm CA’s understanding 
TAKEOFF + Take control of aircraft while finishing checklist 
+ Shoulder harnesses 
+ “Clear” runway 
+ Identify/remember turns 
+ Follow hold-short instructions 
+ Identify/Remember aircraft to follow 
Taxi.. in reality
Return to gate
Malfunction
Loukopoulos,	Dismukes,	Barshi	
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Failed to start engine #-2 - distracted while discussing special operations for destination; omitted checklists - delay takeoff 
Confuse own position on taxiway diagram - new terminal; studying NOTAMs; runway change – 
taxied into ditch 
Neglected to set flaps - preoccupied with new departure clearance and packs-off operation - aborted takeoff 
Incorrect trim setting - checklist interrupted after item had been read but not verified – aborted takeoff 
Started taxi without clearance – rushed by other aircraft waiting 
to pull into gate; radio congestion; marshaller’s headset 
inoperative – query by Ground controller 
Omitted call for flaps - rushed to clear ramp/gate area for arriving aircraft - aborted takeoff 
Omitted checklist - busy with delayed engine start and 
checklists;  rushed to accept takeoff clearance - flaps 
not set, aborted takeoff 
Omitted checking into bleed air indicator light-busy with delayed engine start 
and checklists –  
crew rushed to perform delayed engine start – flew with potential equipment 
problem 
Omitted flaps - crew discussing problem with APU, delayed flaps due to snow - aborted takeoff 
Flaps incorrectly set, missed noticing during checklist - 
crew busy with fuel problem, runway changes, programming 
FMC - aborted takeoff 
Omit checklist - running late, 
checklist interrupted by Tower, 
unexpected clearance for 
takeoff - aborted takeoff 
FO failed to monitor CA - busy checking and 
correcting calculations of load data - aircraft 
taxied past hold short line 
Fail to confirm flap position - evaluating heavy rain showers; rushed to accept takeoff 
clearance - aborted takeoff 
FO failed to monitor CA – busy with 
flow; night taxi – taxied in wrong 
direction 
CA taxis without having fully understood instructions - busy 
looking at other aircraft on taxiway and ramp – warning issued 
by Ground controller 
FO failed to monitor CA - busy with pre-takeoff preparations - aircraft crossed 
hold short line 
FO failed to monitor CA - busy reprogramming FMC for runway change - taxied past 
intended taxiway 
Flaps incorrectly set - late paperwork and runway change; 
programming FMC;short taxi; rushed to accept takeoff 
clearance - aborted takeoff 
Started taxi without clearance - trouble-shooting problem with engine start - nearly 
hit ground handler 
Started taxi without clearance - crew discussing taxi instructions - struck pushback tug 
Omitted flaps-checklist 
interrupted by Tower; crew 
rushed to accept takeoff 
clearance-aborted takeoff 
Omitted flaps - checklist interrupted by thrust 
reverser light; crew busy troubleshooting - 
aborted takeoff 
Misunderstood Tower instruction - new FO on IOE, CA coaching FO - taxied onto runway 
without clearance 
Taxi  Errors 

Casner, S. M., Geven, R. W., and Williams, K. T. (2013). The effectiveness of airline 
Pilot training for abnormal events. Human Factors 55(3), 477-485. 
http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/55/3/477.abstract 
 
Casner, S. M., Geven, R. W., Recker, M. P., and Schooler, J. W. (2014). The retention 
Of manual flying skills in the automated cockpit. Human Factors 56(8), 1506-1516. 
http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.abstract 
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maria-konnikova/hazards-automation 
Stalls	
Wind	Shear	Encounter	at	600’	on	Landing	
Engine	Failure	on	Takeoﬀ	Aber	V1	
THREE	ABNORMAL	EVENTS	PRESENTED	IN	TWO	WAYS	
EXPECTED	
The	Familiar	Ways	We	See	in	Training	
	
•	Classic	“stall	series”	demo	
•	Wind	shear	aber	suggesWve	ATIS	
•	V1	cut	on	2nd	or	3rd	takeoﬀ	
UNEXPECTED	
Diﬀerent,	Less	Expected	Ways	
	
•	Stall	on	departure	at	2,500	b	
•	High-alWtude	(FL340)	stall	
•	Wind	shear	aber	calm	winds	ATIS	
	and	no	“wind	shear”	alert	
•	V1	cut	on	1st	takeoﬀ	of	session	
18	current	747-400	pilots.	
Compared	EXPECTED	and	UNEXPECTED	
THRUST	RESPONSE:	
STALLS	
*	
WIND	SHEAR	ON	LANDING	
ALTITUDE	LOST:	*	
CONFIGURATION	CHANGES:	
EXPECTED:	2	of	18	changed	conﬁg.	
UNEXPECTED:		10	of	18	changed	conﬁg.	
*	
V1	CUT	
9	pilots	saw	failure	on	ﬁrst	takeoﬀ.	
	2	aborted	aber	V1	
9	pilots	saw	failure	on	later	takeoﬀ.	
	All	9	conWnued	
WHAT WE SEE IN THE MEDIA 
B747-400 SIMULATOR STUDY: 
We asked 16 current B744 pilots to fly published arrivals, approaches,  
and missed approaches in 
five different automation situations: 
 
1.  Full automation 
2.  No autopilot 
3.  No flight director 
4.  No FMC 
5.  Instrument system failures with no EICAS 
How bad is this really? 
“Manual flying” refers to a broad collection of skills.  Are we forgetting all of it? 
Do we need to launch a comprehensive program to train everything? 
Do we really have a problem? 
PILOT PERFORMANCE: HAND FLYING & RAW DATA 
PILOT PERFORMANCE: DEALING WITH FAILURES 
Conclusions from these three studies 
We seem to do a good job training crews for the training situations,  
but perhaps not such a good job for the (unexpected) line situations. 
 
Hand-eye skills that are “just like riding a bike” seem to be reasonably well- 
retained if initially well-learned, even when they are not practiced very often:   
e.g., raw data flying.  But still could use some practice. 
 
We don’t seem to have a performance problem, but a recognition problem.   
When pilots recognize the situation correctly – they respond correctly. 
 
We may not be losing “manual flying skills,” 
But we seem to be losing “manual thinking skills!” 
 
So,	
maybe	we	are	not	teaching	right.	
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Barshi, I. (2015).  From Healy’s training principles  
to training specifications:  
The case of the Comprehensive LOFT.   
American Journal of Psychology, 128, 219-227.  
Psychological principles underlying The Comprehensive LOFT: 
 
•  Strategic use of knowledge and scaffolding 
•  Deliberate practice 
•  Generation effect 
•  Depth of processing 
•  Variability of practice 
•  Spacing 
•  Procedural reinstatement 
•  … 
Additional Information: 
THANK YOU for your attention 
 
Or contact me at:  Immanuel.Barshi@nasa.gov 
